On this Thanksgiving of 2012, I am thankful for quite a bit …

Seeing as how I’m always one to constantly complain about the malaise of my sports teams, I wanted to change things up this Thanksgiving. It’s time to give thanks, be merry, and spread holiday cheer!

I’m thankful for a lot of things this year. I’m thankful to have the peace-of-mind and clarity of thought to even write about basketball right now – if even for free. I’m thankful for the Denver Nuggets. I’m thankful for an NBA franchise to call my own. I’m thankful to have this forum on which to spout my beliefs as if it’s gospel (it isn’t). I’m thankful for every single person who has read something I’ve written and maybe come to a new understanding of the ways in which the world turns (not always correct, but new).

I’m thankful for Ty Lawson’s blinding speed. I’m thankful for 36 year-old Andre Miller and his (hopefully movable) 3-year, $14.65 million dollar contract. I’m thankful for 6-6. I’m thankful for Andre Iguodala’s steady resolve. I’m thankful for “The Manimal”, Kenneth Bernard Faried Lewis. I’m thankful to be able to see Faried every single night he suits up to play for my favorite team. I’m thankful to see him not shrink from the competition of playing the Timberwolves’, Kevin Love.

I’m thankful that a lot of the things I say aren’t taken seriously.

I am thankful for Danilo Gallinari’s monumentally momentous braggadocios swag. I’m thankful for Ohio State grad, Kosta Koufos. I’m thankful for Kosta Koufos? I’m thankful for Kosta freaking Koufos! I’m thankful for Corey Brewer’s locomotive.  I’m thankful for Jordan Hamilton’s 44% 3-point shooting through seven games played. I’m thankful for Gallinari and Iguodala’s identical Player Efficiency Ranking (PER). I’m thankful for Timofey Mozgov’s unused brilliance off the bench. I’m thankful for over 7-years of George Karl’s patronage, coaching, ego, and consecutive playoff appearances – and what will hopefully be a continued cancer-free bill of health.

I’m thankful for the services of every Denver Nuggets player past and present – even those who may not have received the kindest of exits. I’m thankful for Carmelo Anthony’s heart-stopping buzzer-beaters. I’m thankful for 33-points in one quarter. I’m thankful for Nene Hilario’s near-decade of service to the city, the franchise, and the community at-large. I’m thankful for Chauncey Billups’ brief return home and the Western Conference Finals that materialized because of his presence. I’m thankful for the brief time Arron Afflalo spent in Denver as a result of Chauncey’s recruitment. I’m thankful for Chris “Birdman” Andersen’s colorful energy, Al Harrington’s inefficiency and locker room chill, Renaldo Balkman’s weed habit, Anthony Carter’s clutch passing, Melvin Ely’s cardboard cutout of Melvin Ely, Shelden Williams’s immense forehead, Kenyon Martin’s amazing tattoo, J.R. Smith’s amazing tattoos, and Malik Allen’s cardboard cutout of Malik Allen. I’m thankful for Joey Graham. Wait, who?

And I will forever be thankful for Mr. Frenchie, Johan Petro.

I’m thankful for 4-points, 14-rebounds, 4 turnovers, and six personal fouls in 35-minutes and 26-seconds. I’m thankful for sobriety.

I’m thankful for people even humoring me into listening to what I have to say.

I’m thankful for Tad Boyle. Praise be to Jesus, I’m thankful for Tad Boyle. I’m thankful for Josh Scott’s post presence and free-throw shooting. I’m thankful for Askia Booker’s confidence and leadership. I’m thankful for the rebounding tenacity of Andre Roberson and the bright future of Xavier Johnson and Spencer Dinwiddie. I’m thankful for the #23 ranking in the latest Associated Press poll – 15 years in the making. Look ma, it’s the real deal!

I’m thankful for Jon Embree and any man willing to take on the responsibility of rebuilding a once-proud college football powerhouse from the depths of despair.

I’m thankful for Peyton Manning. I’m thankful for Von Miller and Elvis Dumervil. I’m thankful for Willis effing McGahee. I’m thankful for Brandon Stokley, Demariyus Thomas, and Ronnie Hillman. I’m thankful for Von Miller and Elvis Dumervil again. I’m thankful for John Elway and Pat Bowlen and John Fox and Jack Del Rio. I’m thankful for Peyton fucking Manning.

I’m thankful for the end of Tebow-mania.

I’m thankful for the pick-and-roll. I’m thankful for the Triangle, the Princeton, and the Motion offense. I’m thankful for Steve Nash skip-passes. I’m thankful for Rasheed Wallace blind-passes out of the post. I’m thankful for J.R. Smith pull-up jumpers in transition. I’m thankful for Dirk Nowitzki operating out of the high-post. I’m thankful for Carmelo Anthony – starting power forward. I’m even more thankful for everything he does on a nightly basis despite never getting enough respect from NBA officials. I’m thankful for Paul Pierce’s mid-range game. I’m thankful for Rajon Rondo’s developing jumper. I’m thankful for Jason Terry’s airplane spin and Ray Allen’s buzzer-beating 3-pointers on the wing. I’m thankful for Chris Paul-to-Blake Griffin alley-oops.  I’m thankful for Jamal Crawford. I’m thankful for Portland Trail Blazers fans. I’m thankful for Damian Lillard. I’m thankful for Andre Miller’s lob passes and post-game and “savvy veteran leadership”.

I’m thankful for the coaching mastery of Doug Collins, the smooth shooting of Kevin Martin, and the end of Linsanity.

I’m thankful for Klay Thompson.

I’m thankful for the genius of the San Antonio Spurs. I’m thankful for Tim Duncan’s Hall-of-Fame career, Manu Ginobili’s Euro-step, the fancy footwork of Frenchman, Tony Parker, and the immutable Gregg Popovich’s class, crass, and sass.

I’m thankful for Mike Dunlap and the emerging brilliance of Kemba Walker. I’m thankful for Zach Randolph and the likely Jared Sullinger comparisons I make in the future. I’m even thankful for Gerald Wallace and Brook Lopez, interestingly enough.

I’m thankful for Kobe Bryant’s renaissance.

I’m thankful for the unmatched and untouched and unmitigated dominance of one LeBron Raymone James.

I’m thankful for the Wages of Wins stat geeks. I’m thankful for Matt Moore and the rest of the unrelenting taunting, trolling ignoramuses on Twitter.

And I’m thankful for you.

Thank you for reading. Thank you for arguing. Thank you for being there. Thank you for everything.

Happy Holidays. Go Nuggets!

I will always be thankful for this:

The Denver Nuggets Blueprint to 50-wins: Part II (RED FLAGS)

Before laying out the blueprint for Denver’s path to 50-wins we must first discuss the things that could be a detriment; if we refuse to address potential problem areas, we will be ill-equipped to handle them if and when they do arise.

POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS AND HOW TO MITIGATE THEM

The problem in adding Andre Iguodala isn’t that he’s a bad player. Because he is actually a very, very good player. I have never claimed otherwise. The problem in adding Iguodala to the equation and subtracting Afflalo and Al Harrington is you’re not addressing the areas where you’re weakest; rather, you’re making yourself worse. Three large causes for concern from last year remain: free-throw shooting, 3-point shooting, and turnovers. None of these are George Karl problems, mind you. They are those of NBA’s rising star executive, Masai Ujiri, acting team President Josh Kroenke, and the rest of Denver’s front office and scouting department.

1. Free throw shooting:
   • The Nuggets were one of the worst free throw shooting teams in the league last year, as they went 73.5% from the line. Only Washington, Chicago, Cleveland, the Clippers, and Orlando were worse. Of those five teams, only Chicago, Los Angeles, and Orlando were playoff teams – outside of L.A., each was eliminated in the first round. Is it likely Denver gets even worse from the line this year? Yes. Last year’s numbers included Nene Hilario’s 33-game contribution. JaVale McGee, a categorically and catastrophically worse free-throw shooter (due in part to his fitness-induced asthma), only contributed about 16-games to their mean percentage. A full season of McGee, Faried, and Iguodala in tandem with the absence of Afflalo, Nene, and Harrington should prove to be their death-knell. Free throw shooting has cost this team games in the past. They will do so even more this year. How it continues to be a problem for this star-studded front office is one of life’s greatest mysteries.
   • Estimating potential free throw percentages for Denver this season is inherently difficult because the statistic itself varies so much – especially with a roster-full of sub-par shooters from the stripe. However, a full season of McGee and Faried, along with the addition of Iguodala and loss of Afflalo and Al Harrington would land Denver second-to-last in free throw shooting last season at about 71% (ahead of only the Clippers and Magic with Dwight Howard). I anticipate the number being even worse, seeing as how McGee’s percentage will likely land below the 50% used in that average.
     • Anyone with eyes can see JaVale’s fitness-induced asthma causing him trouble playing at George Karl’s pace at this altitude. When visiting the free throw line specifically, McGee can be seen slouching over on his knees trying to catch his wind. If a player cannot catch his wind, he cannot under any circumstances be expected to concentrate on free throws. Sorry. I guess you’d have to be an inherently understanding person to get that.
   • Fine. Free throw shooting is going to be a concern. That wouldn’t be such a huge problem if not for …
2. 3-point shooting:
   • The Nuggets were one of the league’s worst three-point shooting teams last season, as they shot 33.3% from distance. Only the Grizzlies, Lakers, Jazz, Wizards, Kings, and Bobcats were worse. The first three were playoff teams (two of which were eliminated in the first round); the last three were not. Is it possible they get worse this season from long-range? There is no doubt about it whatsoever. And it’s going to be pretty, pretty difficult to get worse than Denver was last year.
   • As with free throw shooting, 3-point shooting is inherently difficult to predict because there is so much variance. But, if we take away Arron Afflalo and Al Harrington’s 3-point contributions from last year and average Iguodala’s career mark with the rest of his new Denver teammates, the Nuggets would finish with a likely 3-point shooting percentage of precisely 28.2%. That figure includes Jordan Hamilton’s limited career numbers as well as Gallinari’s career percentage (not his subpar showing last year). A composite mark of 28.2% from three would put Denver behind Charlotte last year for the league’s worst 3-point shooting. At least the Bobcats shot 74.6% from the free throw line.
   • Free throw shooting and three-point shooting might be among the league’s worst, but, it’s not something they can’t overcome, right? Right?
3. Turnovers:
   • During the contracted 2011-12 season, the Denver Nuggets turned the ball over more than 24 other NBA teams. The only teams to turn the ball over more than Denver were the Cavs, Hornets, Pistons, Knicks, and Thunder. The Knicks and Thunder were the only teams to make the playoffs out of that group, with New York bowing out during the first round and Oklahoma City making a run to the Finals. The eventual NBA Champion Miami Heat turned the ball over only thirteen-times less than Denver over the course of the 2012 regular season. The only difference between first round fodder Denver and New York, and eventual Finals participants Miami and Oklahoma City, is one of talent. The Nuggets and Knicks in no way match up in relative talent with the Thunder or Heat.
   • As for the Cavs, Hornets, Wizards, Raptors, and Pistons (teams who similarly faced a problem with turnovers last year), only the Wizards would come close to Denver’s woeful 3-point shooting simulation from last season. As for free throw shooting, only the Cavs and Wizards would rival Denver during our similar simulation. This is a potentially catastrophic confluence of events Denver has brewing. It’s the Perfect Storm.
   • The addition of Iguodala in place of Arron Afflalo in terms of turnovers has been covered ad nausea in this space. But I more than expect Denver to turn the ball over with increased frequency this season because Iguodala is prone to that sort of thing in even the slowest-paced offenses. In George Karl’s run-and-gun fast break, this is going to be another potentially catastrophic cause for concern.
   • Another cause for concern with respect to turnovers is a full season of the inherent unreliability of JaVale McGee and Kenneth Faried.
   • The Nuggets can no longer play the same reckless basketball they’ve been known for in year’s past. They are not good enough individually for it to be a sustainable strategy. And if George Karl isn’t going to demand better of his players or install a more structured and regimented offensive game plan, then perhaps he isn’t the man for the job any longer.
   • In 2009-10, the Nuggets were able to minimize their turnovers because they had good players with good hands. When a roster gets chock-full of players with terrible hands, I take it to mean the front office or scouting department is not watching enough basketball. Because there is absolutely no use in drafting or trading for players who can barely hold onto the basketball. If you aren’t watching laborious film of players you intend on adding to your roster, you will face the consequences.

Free throws, 3-point shooting, and turnovers are the three biggest causes for concern entering this season and the addition of Andre Iguodala does not in any way mitigate them, for his presence makes it an even greater concern. However, irrespective of those areas, there remains an elephant in the room no one is discussing.

Opponent blocked shots:

• The number of shots Ty Lawson, Kenneth Faried and JaVale McGee have blocked is incalculable. It’s either a dunk, or it’s a block. There exists very little in-between. During last year’s truncated schedule, the Nuggets had more of their shots blocked (439) than any other team in the NBA and over one-hundred more than the league average (336). The second-place Sacramento Kings had 16-less shots blocked over the course of their season; the third-place Cavaliers faced 30-less.
• In fact, of the top-twelve teams to face the most opponent shot-blocks, seven didn’t make the playoffs: Sacramento Kings, Cleveland Cavaliers, New Orleans Hornets, Charlotte Bobcats, Minnesota Timberwolves, Detroit Pistons, and Houston Rockets. Those are some of the very worst teams in the league—all of whom performed better from the free throw line and 3-point line than Denver during our simulation. Furthermore, of the five teams to actually see the postseason (Denver, Indiana, Utah, Memphis, and Chicago), only the Pacers advanced past the first round.
  • The same holds true of 2010-11, where the numbers are even starker: Of the thirteen teams to face the most blocked-shots in the league, only the Grizzlies, Nuggets, and Pacers saw playoff basketball – with the Grizzlies the only team to advance.
  • In 2009-10, the numbers weren’t much better: Only six of the fifteen teams to face the most blocked-shots made the playoffs, and of those six only San Antonio and Utah (who defeated Denver) advanced past the first round. You will find this is true throughout history until the mid-1980s, when you could still be a moderately successful team while sustaining a league-leading number of blocks.
• Why does Denver find itself the victim of so many blocked shots?
  • They force their undersized point guard to initiate their dribble-drive penetration offense. Because Denver is so bereft of shooting ability after the Afflalo trade, each and every defense Lawson faces is going to collapse on him once he enters the painted area; something they did more than enough before the Iguodala deal. On the occasions where Lawson finds himself near the rim, his size limits his abilities to convert a field goal and/or draw a foul. More often than not, he gets his shot blocked.
    • Last year alone, 9.2% of Lawson’s shots were blocked, according to Hoop Data. The league average is 5.9% among point guards. Per-40 minutes, 1.32 Lawson shots were blocked (with the league average among point guards at 0.802).
    • Tyreke Evans is the only other starting point guard to come close to Lawson in terms of having his shot blocked (8.3% blocked, 1.39 per-40 minutes). Russell Westbrook faces more blocks per-40 minutes (1.41) but a much lower overall percentage (6.5%) due to volume, I’d imagine. Cavs rookie Kyrie Irving has similar traits to Westbrook (7% blocked, 1.33 per-40 minutes).
    • It’s the percentage of Lawson’s shots getting blocked that give me greatest concern, because his job isn’t going to be any easier this season; it may become much more difficult seeing as Arron Afflalo’s spacing is lost. And without a mid-range game like those of Westbrook and Irving, it’s not going to get better for Ty. (In 2010-11, ten-percent of his shots were blocked; his rookie season, 2009-10, 11.5%.)
  • Their starting power forward Kenneth Faried is forced to assume the role of defensive stopper on the interior at one end and put back missed shots inside on the other. Because of the encumbrances his size produce, he invariably has his shots blocked by a bevy of bigger, longer opponents. It happens early. It happens often. And it becomes quite bothersome to the keen observer.
    • Last year alone, 13.9% of Faried’s shots were blocked, according to Hoop Data. The league average is 6.3% among forwards. Per-40 minutes, Kenneth Faried had 1.66 of his shots blocked (the league average is less than half that–0.806). He is a starting power forward in the NBA.
    • Among forwards, the only other player to see at least 40-games while averaging at least 22-minutes per appearance and face the same difficulties inside was Tristan Thompson (15.8% blocked, 1.97 per-40 minutes).
    • Other than those two players, no one else in the entire NBA really comes close.
  • JaVale McGee is not good. That’s pretty much all that needs to be said. Period.

Notes:

The number of blocked shots Denver sustained last year (439) averaged out over a full 82-game season equates to 545.42, which is well short of the 1991-92 team record of 593, when they went 24-58. The 2002-03 Nuggets, who won just 17-games, suffered through 538 blocks. The 1997-98 Nuggets, winners of just 11 total games, succumbed to 538 as well. The fact that Denver is the sole owner of this statistic, especially among their worst teams, is an awfully ominous indicator. However, it makes sense. When a team has a bevy of offensively incompetent players, all potential spacing is tossed out the window and defenses collapse on the best players to block all the shots they can muster. I anticipate Denver coming close to the team record of 593 this season — especially if the coaching staff and front office is intent on pushing square pegs into round holes by giving Faried and McGee heavy minutes in their rotation.

• The 1991-92 Nuggets hold the team record for second-most blocks sustained in a season with 593. That team went 24-58 and is most comparable to the one Masai Ujiri has built in Denver this season. They did not shoot well from the 3-point line or the free throw line, nor were they proficient in holding onto the basketball (league-leader in turnovers). The only difference between that Denver team and the one George Karl will be coaching now is their respective offensive ratings, as this season’s squad is unlikely to have the league’s worst offense due to their superior passing, their ability to get to the line and draw fouls, and what is hopefully a better aptitude for holding onto the basketball. You just wonder if the free throw shooting and 3-point shooting is going to be poor enough to plunder that altogether. The 1991-92 Nuggets were middling defensively (which is where I’d imagine this one ends up as well).
  • To wit, that Nuggets team was the seventh-best in the league in offensive rebound percentage (34.%), another thing I expect the 2012-13 iteration to mirror.
  • They were also fourth-best in terms of turnover rating, having caused opponents to relinquish possession of the ball 14.7% of the time.
• The 1993-94 New Jersey Nets sustained 582 blocks over a full 82-game season. That team went 45-37, bowing out of the first round of the playoffs against the Knicks. Unlike this year’s Nuggets’ squad, they were fairly proficient from both the free throw line and 3-point line. They also held onto the ball, as only two teams turned the ball over less (Jazz, Cavs).
• The 1992-93 Phoenix Suns sustained over 500 blocks and still found their way to a number-one seed in the Western Conference. However, they were one of the best 3-point shooting teams in the league that season (third-ranked in the NBA) as well as an above-average team in holding onto the ball. They were a middling squad from the free throw line.
• Other teams of note: 1990-91 Orlando Magic (654 blocks sustained), 1991-92 Denver Nuggets, 1984-85 Nuggets, 1983-84 Nuggets, ’82-83 Nuggets (611) and Bulls, ’81-82 Nuggets*.

Last year, Denver was able to shoot a slightly respectable clip from the free throw line because Arron Afflalo was so elite from that spot. Last year, they were able to shoot a slightly respectable clip from the 3-point line because Arron Afflalo was so sickeningly superb despite being the team’s only shooter. Last year, they were able to at least slightly minimize their turnovers because Arron Afflalo was such a good ballhandler in both the half-court and open-court. This year they will have no such luxuries because of the acquisitions of JaVale McGee and Andre Iguodala with the subsequent loss of Arron Afflalo.

The only two playoff teams from last year to be found at the bottom-third of the NBA standings in 3-point shooting and free-throw percentage are, you guessed it, the Knicks and Nuggets. Each was eliminated in the first round of the playoffs last year. Each will likely be eliminated in the first round again this year (if either is lucky enough to make it), as none of this translates to success – neither the short-term, long-term, or immediate term – in the playoffs or regular season. However, the Knicks, as opposed to the Nuggets, made a bevy of roster moves to shore up those areas in which they found themselves lacking last year. They signed Jason Kidd. They refused to extend Jeremy Lin’s gaudy contract proposal and brought aboard sharp-shooting point guard, Raymond Felton. They welcomed Marcus Camby back to the Big Apple. They will likely see an increase in both free-throw shooting and three-point shooting team-wide.

The Blueprint: How the Denver Nuggets can reach 50-wins

Christian Petersen/Getty Images

Introduction:

1. A player cannot simply replicate his numbers when moving from one team to the next by sliding in place of the starter for whom he’s been traded. Despite numerous projections from the game’s most renowned and well-respected experts, the game of basketball is much too complex for statistically driven forecasts to hold much weight.
2. Iguodala’s impact in Denver defensively is going to be drastically reduced because of two factors:
   • Doug Collins’ 76ers were the third-best defense in the league last year. Not all of that was due to Iguodala’s presence. Some of it, for sure. But much of it had to do with with Philadelphia’s team philosophy on both sides of the court.
   • The 76ers’ roster was built from the inside-out by a coach who seemingly had much more say in the direction of his team than George Karl does in Denver. For example, Collins refused hiring an advanced analytics specialist until this past September when new team General Manager and 22-year veteran Sixers employee, Tony DeLeo, made it known he intended on doing so.  In terms of building Philadelphia’s roster before trading for Andrew Bynum, Collins chose Spencer Hawes and one of the most underrated bigs in league history, Elton Brand, as the team’s inside foundation. The reasons for this are many, with the main concern being that if a team can’t rely on its interior, it can’t rely on anything. The Nuggets’ roster as currently constructed, especially following the Nene trade, has for all intents and purposes been built from the outside-in. Lawson is the team’s engine; as Lawson goes, so goes Denver. Their hyper-fluid motion offense dependent on dribble penetration highlights this fact. Furthermore, the Nuggets cannot rely on their interior at either end of the court. Some of this is due to the unorthodox nature of their play (ie. constant fast-break, pressure defense). But a good portion of it is because the two bigs they deem most suitable to playing that style–JaVale McGee and Kenneth Faried–are as fundamentally flawed on the basketball court (particularly defensively) as you can get. A wing defender, no matter his abilities, will not be able to make up for McGee and Faried’s deficiencies inside.

Can this team live up to the lofty expectations members of the national media have bestowed upon it? What players work with Iguodala? How can each individual player actually produce what’s being predicted for them? And will it all add up to over 50-wins?

How the Denver Nuggets can win 50+ games:

To get the requisite production you’re accustomed to from Andre Iguodala you need to surround him with players similar to those that made him so effective — in terms of both skill-set and production. Because if there is one absolute truism it’s that Iggy is not LeBron James. Andre Iguodala can’t go anywhere and win games for you like the King. No one can. Living or dead.

As such, in order to make his transition as seamless as possible, we must cobble out of Denver’s roster–utterly transformed and stripped-down by trades over the last two seasons–different lineup pairings to make the Mile High City’s newest star shine. A player cannot simply replicate his numbers when moving from one team to the next by sliding in place of the starter for whom he’s been traded–especially a starter he’s not similar to in skill set. Expecting that to be the case is the very height of hubris-based ignorance. Too many things go into how a basketball team works. Thankfully, some of us are around to pinpoint potential problems and remedy them before they become a larger, more grave, concern.

When looking at Andre Iguodala’s career-arc we see that as an overall player the last two years were some of his most effective (even though he’s said those years in Philadelphia were among the least enjoyable of his career). In 2011-12, he had the second-lowest turnover rate, second-highest steal-rate, second-highest defensive rebound rate, and the third-highest effective field goal percentage of his career. In the 2010-11 season, Iguodala posted the highest assist rate of his career in conjunction with his second-lowest turnover rate and fourth-lowest usage. What was it about those teams that made him so effective?

The answer is in player, coach and the overarching philosophy surrounding both.

Philadelphia and Doug Collins:

Courtesy: GCOBB

To understand what made Iguodala excel during his last two seasons in Philadelphia, we must first take a look at Doug Collins’ coaching philosophy. Not only is it different from Iggy’s new coach in George Karl, it’s light-years apart.

One thing Collins was devoutly opposed to in Philly was messy, turnover-ridden basketball. It’s why he demanded a slower-pace and half-court setting befitting high-percentage (yes, even those of the mid-range variety) shots that minimized long rebounds leading to run-outs and fast-breaks. It’s the only way he saw a roster of his skill, youth, and talent level reaching optimum success. It was his job, after all, to figure out a way to win the most amount of games he possibly could with what he’d been given. And he hadn’t been given much.

Only five teams took less 3-pointers than the Sixers last season (Pistons, Bobcats, Grizzlies, Jazz, and Hornets). Likewise, Philadelphia turned the ball over a league-low, 10.9%, while playing at the NBA’s seventh-slowest pace. The second-closest team to Philadelphia’s league-lowest turnover rate was Vinny Del Negro’s Los Angeles Clippers, led by the best point guard in the game today, Chris Paul and its elder statesman, Chauncey Billups. The Clippers turned the ball over nearly two full percentage points more (1.8) than Philadelphia. To illustrate this discrepancy, a 1.8% gap between the Clippers and Orlando Magic/Miami Heat is separated by 21 different NBA teams.

Under Collins, the Sixers played a slow-down, methodical, possession-by-endless-possession, grind-it-out, defensive-minded game. Even still, Iguodala turned the ball over 13.6% of the time in Doug Collins’ offense. Arron Afflalo, the player Iguodala is replacing in Denver, turned the ball over just 9.35% of the time in George Karl’s break-neck pace the last two seasons. Some say Afflalo wasn’t as responsible for creating in the same ways as Iguodala. Others posture Afflalo was nothing more than a spot-shooter. These people would be wrong on both counts. Last year, with Afflalo as a primary option in Denver, he put up a 1.4% greater usage rate than Iggy and still turned the ball over 4.3% less.

Statistics in basketball — particularly those of the advanced variety — are having the negative side-effect of divorcing decision-makers from basic, fundamental, sound logic and common sense. Because any person in their right mind would have seen the aforementioned turnover statistic on its own and thought twice about making the trade. George Karl does not advocate winning games using ‘pretty’ basketball. Some of that has to do with the severe lack of talent he’s been given, but most of it has to do with him. Name another coach in the league that would encourage his players to turnover the ball more often rather than less. Messy basketball doesn’t equal winning basketball unless it’s being executed by elite or nearly-elite players (see: 2009 Denver Nuggets).

Team-building, the Denver Nuggets, and Pace:

One major mistake many general managers and team executives make in building their team is architecting it around a single over-arching philosophy. George Karl likes to get out and run in Denver’s altitude. Therefore, his front office has built around that run-and-gun dictum by signing a multitude of athletes to execute it.

There are a number of different problems you encounter when building a team through a philosophy-first approach like Denver is doing now. First, you prove yourselves to be gainfully incapable in a half-court setting unless your players are incredibly skilled and focused on sound fundamentals and consistency at both ends of the floor. Sound fundamentals and defensive consistency do not come naturally to a team as laden with youth as Denver. Those sorts of things develop over time, which is why the best ways of building a team combine youth and veteran alike (see: San Antonio, Oklahoma City, Memphis, Miami, Brooklyn, Boston). Secondly, when a team emphasizes pace over everything else in the way George Karl does, any and all fundamentals go right out the window because players are too focused on moving and not focused enough on detail.

Combine Denver’s lack of familiarity between teammates with their youth and George Karl’s laissez-faire run-and-gun philosophy and you have the makings of a disaster. Some might disagree and point me towards Oklahoma City and the success Scottie Brooks (who learned under Karl) is having with their high-paced and open offense. The problem with that argument is its outright refusal in recognizing the disparity in talent between the Thunder and Nuggets. Ty Lawson, Danilo Gallinari, Andre Iguodala, and Kenneth Faried do not in any universe equate to Russell Westbrook, Kevin Durant, James Harden, and Serge Ibaka — especially offensively. Serge Ibaka is draining 3-pointers from the wing this preseason. Kenneth Faried has a hard enough time holding onto the ball.

Oklahoma City is the benchmark. Sam Presti’s shrewd drafting has earned them that right. Everyone else is just pretending, with Denver captaining the ship. Outside of Kenneth Faried in 2011, the Nuggets haven’t drafted a starting capable player since Kiki Vandegwhe took Jameer Nelson in 2004. The fact Faried is undersized, can’t shoot, lacks a post-game, can’t defend, and is a below-average passer and catcher on top of it all, may require an asterisk besides the Manimal’s name in Denver’s draft history.

This is why it is imperative for teams desiring success to dispatch of this philosophy-first way of thinking. Draft the best players available so that you are able trade them for players who may end up being a better fit within your overarching philosophy later. If a franchise builds from within a half-court mindset first, they set themselves up for success beyond just the regular season. As the Spurs have so effectively illustrated over the last couple of years in transitioning to a more offensive-minded game plan, everyone can run. Half-court players can run just as much as athletes. It’s the level of execution that make the difference.

Tomorrow, I lay out the blueprint for Denver’s 50-win season. And I don’t even advocate for someone’s firing. Thanks for reading.

Why the Andre Iguodala trade doesn’t make Denver better: Part III

In part one of our discussion surrounding the Nuggets’ involvement in the Dwight Howard megadeal, we established Denver was operating at a severe disadvantage in negotiations as they were brought into the discussions on the final day of talks. Given the short amount of time in which they were allotted to make a decision, we took it one step further in part two and showed the caliber of player they relinquished in Arron Afflalo. With Afflalo’s relative place in history clearly established, we will now meticulously outline his importance in Denver’s offense and defense last year. We will then see how Andre Iguodala can fill that void.

Discussion:

Arron Afflalo was probably the best, most consistent, basketball player on the Nuggets roster last season. As has become common with this franchise, they were asking far too much from ‘Trip’ for him to remain (in their eyes) an effective player. Denver’s coaches and front office wanted Afflalo to take on more responsibility offensively while maintaining his near elite-level defense. It’s not simply Afflalo considering himself “the guy”, as many in basketball circles would have you believe. A player of his caliber and dedication doesn’t just decide to stop playing defense. His 19.1% usage rate last year was a career-high, and over a 3-point jump from 2010-11. No, what happened with Afflalo more than anything was an inability to handle his new responsibilities on offense while sustaining effort defensively on a possession-by-possession basis during a contracted schedule where teams were playing as many as five games in seven nights.

As can be seen here using Basketball Reference’s advanced stats calculation — an arbitrary measure, to be sure — Afflalo’s defense isn’t what fell off last year. It was mostly his offense, specifically his shooting percentages. In 2010-11, when he was surrounded by a bevy of capable shooters, Arron naturally shot better from the perimeter because he was privileged to have more space to do so. In 2011-12, with the exodus of Nene Hilario’s skilled passing and offensive presence inside, the reduced capabilities of Danilo Gallinari (because of injuries to both he and Nene in tandem with Nene’s trade), J.R. Smith’s production replaced with Cory Brewer’s, and Raymond Felton/Chauncey Billups’s dead-eye shooting from range replaced with Andre Miller’s set-shot, Afflalo had more attention payed his way when Denver had the ball on offense. Besides maintaining his elite-level defense, Denver asked him to shoulder the load for them offensively when all of their best shooters from the prior year were in another city. George Karl has been documented as being critical of Afflalo’s defense. He did so openly and honestly during NBA TV’s ‘The Association’ broadcast. An interaction which, if you pay close attention, includes Afflalo silently brushing aside his coach’s criticisms. I’m sure Arron is guilty of having his concentration wane playing through Denver’s injury-ravaged, trade-wrecked mess of a lockout-shortened season. I guess you would have to be an inherently understanding and empathetic person to see these things.

Trip is a key player to build your franchise around on the wing (which is why Orlando is now doing it. Like Sam Presti did in San Antonio and Oklahoma City before him with Manu Ginobili and James Harden, Rob Hennigan is doing in Orlando with Arron Afflalo.) But Trip isn’t so good that he can make up for an entire team’s systemic defensive shortcomings such as those exhibited by Denver last season. The Nuggets’ front office didn’t see it this way and moved him in the blockbuster trade that brought Iguodala to Denver and sent Afflalo and power forward Al Harrington to Orlando.

Now, on the surface, this seems like a great move by Nuggets management. They were able to move a player who they believe has peaked in Afflalo and an inefficient, overpaid, stretch-four in Al Harrington for an All Star, Olympic Gold Medalist, and all-World defender in Iguodala. And as Josh Kroenke readily admitted during Iguodala’s introductory news conference, he’s a player the Nuggets have coveted in year’s past. The problem, however, lies in Denver’s inability to see the forest through the trees.

Why I would not have done the deal:

Before moving forward, there are three things we must pay attention to that are of vital importance in this discussion: 1. Inconsistencies in the data. 2. Arron Afflalo’s place in history as a shooter. 3. Usage rate differentials.

1. Inconsistencies in the data. Many people like to use one form of measuring a player and stick to it. Some use John Hollinger’s Player Efficiency Rating (PER). Followers of the Wages of Wins Network use Wins Produced. Fans perusing Basketball-Reference sometimes cite win shares and other similar derivatives. This is faulty thinking because it can lead to bad decision-making. If you’re not breaking down the numbers to their very bottom, you’re not doing your job. Case in point: If we look at Afflalo and Iguodala’s Player Efficiency Rating (PER) through each’s first five seasons, we find a significant gap of 4.6 points in Iggy’s favor. However, if we pay attention to Afflalo and Iguodala’s per-36 minute numbers and look at free-throw shooting specifically, we find that ‘Dre gets to the line about 2.3 more times per game, hitting 1.6 more free-throws per each appearance. Because he is able to get to the line with such greater frequency than Afflalo, his PER, Wins Produced, and win share numbers become vastly inflated. Yes, getting to the line is valuable. But it is also something of a choice. A player can choose to attack if/when he’s able. It isn’t an inherent skill. Arron Afflalo isn’t deciding to draw fouls less frequently because he likes taking jumpers. He’s taking jumpers because that’s what’s available in the flow of the offense and no better options exist in terms of attacking an already clogged lane full of players who cannot, will not, and are not able to space the floor (see: Faried, Kenneth; McGee, JaVale; Martin, Kenyon).
2. Arron Afflalo was historically elite at one thing — shooting the basketball. Considering he was Denver’s only shooter, and a historically elite one at that, I believe it’s more than fair to expect a tremendous drop-off in Denver’s offense this season. There were instances last year, particularly in the Nuggets’ first round playoff series with Los Angeles, that Afflalo and Lawson were the entirety of their team’s half-court offense. Faried couldn’t be counted on to score. JaVale certainly couldn’t be counted on to score. And we’ve already gone over Gallinari’s drop-off following the loss of Nene. In that series it was mostly Lawson and Afflalo. And in games where Lawson no-showed (which is a more common occurrence than anyone would like to admit), Denver relied on Afflalo as a primary option. So, in addition to guarding one of the league’s most physical, aggressive, and premiere offensive players in Kobe Bryant, the Nuggets were asking Afflalo to be a primary option for his own team’s offense–and be guarded by the very same Kobe Bryant in the process. That is something for which he is just not capable. No one outside of a select few players in the world is capable of that — LeBron James being one of them. And no, neither is Andre Iguodala. Certainly, Iggy can contain Kobe Bryant. But he cannot produce offensive numbers anywhere near Afflalo’s — particularly shooting the basketball against a defensive opponent of Bryant’s caliber. Asking Trip to undertake the task of playing Kobe Bryant head-to-head is irresponsible, unprofessional, and mindlessly arcane, especially when Bryant has Andrew Bynum and Pau Gasol to rely on inside and Afflalo has nothing. Bryant and Afflalo’s respective numbers in the Los Angeles series bear this out, as they battled each other to a relative standstill statistically.
3. The difference in Iguodala and Afflalo’s usage rate is pronounced through their first five seasons. However, during the lockout-shortened season last year, Trip faced a tremendous uptick in usage — a number on the level of Iguodala’s five-season mark. Afflalo was able to maintain his shooting numbers for the most part given his increased usage, his role as a primary option in Denver’s offense, and the stunning lack of capable offensive players surrounding him. They weren’t on the level of his numbers in the year prior when he had better teammates, but they were vastly superior to Iguodala’s.

If we are to compare Andre Iguodala and Arron Afflalo side-by-side as players, the trade appears to be mostly a wash. Early on in Iguodala’s career, he was incorrectly labeled a scorer. As can be seen from the statistical curve through his first five seasons, he took that label and ran with it — except, he didn’t. Through each player’s first five seasons, and per-36 minutes, Afflalo and Iguodala’s statistics are starkly similar. Outside of ‘Trip’s’ clearly superior three-point and free-throw shooting, Iggy has the edge in defensive rebounding (1.2 >;), assists (1.9>;), steals (1>;), and, unfortunately for him, turnovers (1>;).

With all that said, given Afflalo’s 8%-edge from three and his 4.5%-edge from the free-throw line to go with his stellar turnover-rate and marginally worse rebounding and assist numbers, I agree with Rob Hennigan in choosing Afflalo to build around on the wing over Andre Iguodala. He’s younger, cheaper, has no injury history to speak of (Iguodala is coming off his first major injury last year), is a historically elite shooter, doesn’t rely on athleticism for success, and works tirelessly to improve his game on a daily basis. Afflalo is still growing as a player. In the right situation, he could be downright scary.

Furthermore, a wing player’s primary responsibility is to shoot, and in so doing, free up space on the interior for his frontline to dominate. If and when his teammates get doubled down-low, that frees up shooters on the wing to knock down open shot after open shot after open shot (think of Ray Allen in Boston with Kevin Garnett; or Manu Ginobili and Kawhi Leonard in San Antonio with Tim Duncan; or James Harden with Serge Ibaka in Oklahoma City; or Nene Hilario with Arron Afflalo in Denver).

Given Denver’s veritable lack of an inside presence following the Nene trade, it makes Afflalo’s shooting contributions even more pronounced. Granted, we are in the middle of a new “small-ball” era where a prototypical ‘post-option’ is no longer necessary. Teams like Oklahoma City and Miami are running with lineups where everyone on the floor is a threat from 3-to-9 feet and beyond. The problem with Denver’s roster is that (outside of Danilo Gallinari) it doesn’t work from 3-to-9 feet, from 10-to-15 feet, or from 15-to-23 feet. It never really did. In basketball, however, as the San Antonio Spurs and Oklahoma City Thunder have so clearly pointed out, spacing is everything on offense. Afflalo’s shooting numbers from 2011 (when he was surrounded by capable offensive players) bear this out ten-fold.

Arron Afflalo-Andre Iguodala player comparison after five seasons per 36-minutes (Courtesy of Basketball-Reference)

Arron Afflalo-Andre Iguodala comparison after five seasons-Advanced (Courtesy of Basketball-Reference)

More to come ….

What’s Denver Missing in Timofey Mozgov?

When it looked more and more like Carmelo Anthony was going to be traded to the New York Knicks instead of the New Jersey Nets last February, there was much consternation in Gotham and the Mile High City over exactly what the teams would exchange. Danilo Gallinari was New York’s main attraction. He was going to Denver regardless. Then Knicks’ starting point guard Raymond Felton was floated as being part of the deal along with swingman Wilson Chandler. Denver smartly drew the process out to the very end of the trade deadline, expertly pitting Mikhail Prokhorov’s New Jersey Nets against the Knicks for ‘Melo’s services. Masai Ujiri famously “pushed the goalposts” back for New York to cross. He knew they were all-in for Carmelo. Just as the trade was going to be completed, Ujiri requested that 24 year-old Russian 7-foot center, Timofey Mozgov, be included. The Knicks had reached their breaking point. Until they didn’t.

A New Team:

At one point during Denver’s second game together following the trade’s completion against the Portland Trailblazers, ‘Timo’ as he is known, completed a nifty and-1 in the paint. He showed upper body strength and touch around the rim I never knew he had. I quickly exclaimed on Twitter that he deserved a real chance at starting for the Nuggets during the upcoming season.

He continued this solid play through the end of the 2011 season and into the playoffs. When the lockout finally lifted, Timofey found himself in the starting unit for Denver’s season-opener the day after Christmas against the Mavericks. Alongside Nene Hilario, Denver’s beast (finally) at power forward, the Nuggets were going to have one of the most imposing front-lines in the NBA. This was the way to win a title in the Association without a “superstar”. Build a physically imposing, highly-skilled front court that could just as easily matchup with the oversized Lakers and Bulls as it could the quicker Thunder, Clippers, and Grizzlies. Until Mozgov got hurt. And then Nene got hurt. And then Gallo. Every single member of Denver’s front court, listed at 6-foot-10 and above, was out at one point due to injury. And any and all well-intentioned plans were abandoned. Nene was traded for JaVale McGee. Mozgov came back healthy, but, having lost his starting role to Kosta Koufos and backup role to McGee, couldn’t find his confidence or his way. Gallo came back healthy and, having lost his only reliable pick-and-roll partner in Nene, precipitously regressed to an isolation and post-scorer. In one fell-swoop, Denver went from near-contender to JaVale McGee punchline. It was neither pretty, nor fluid.

Through all this, however, Nuggets’ brass held onto the Russian big man. I have continually chirped on Twitter that ‘Mozzy’ is one of Denver’s most-skilled players. This has fallen mostly on deaf ears. In my previous post I reiterated this point and faced a pretty harsh backlash for it. According to those allegedly smarter than myself, Mozgov’s skill level is nowhere near tops on this team. So, I decided to do some research and see if I could in any way back up my “nonsensical” claims. The findings were interesting to say the least.

The Beginning:

At one point during the playoffs, when the Indiana Pacers were playing the Miami Heat, I marveled at how Indiana was built. They get it, I said. They get it. David West and Roy Hibbert were the perfect pairing in the front court to build around. Indeed, Indiana did get it. Larry Bird won the executive of the year award just four days later, as voted on by a panel of his peers. They didn’t have a star. They didn’t lead the league in jersey sales. They weren’t noteworthy on ‘Inside the NBA’. Whether intentional or not, Larry Legend modeled his team after what Sam Presti had done with the Spurs in San Antonio; reliable horses at center/power forward, a quick, strong point guard, and steady, tough bench production. Memphis and Chicago were built in similar ways. Denver was almost on that path.

The template had been set. And Indiana was living proof. How amazing was it? Less than a year prior, people were actually discussing the prospect of contracting Larry Bird’s Pacers from the NBA altogether. Now they were on the verge of pushing the Miami Heat, and title favorite, out of the playoffs entirely. The NBA is a tricky place. And Larry Bird had mastered it.

The Breakthrough:

I kept observing Roy Hibbert. Rewinding and pausing and rewinding and pausing, until I started to get dizzy. I watched his off-ball movement on offense, and his shield, cover, and retrieval on defense. He was almost a defensive savant. I then made the ghastly pronouncement on Twitter that there was no reason Mozgov couldn’t do what Hibbert had exhibited in Indiana. Roy Hibbert wasn’t doing anything spectacular. He was merely playing fundamentally sound basketball.

Mozgov/Hibbert rookie season comparison

Mozgov/Hibbert comparison at age 25

Then I delved into the numbers. My curiosity was first piqued by Mozgov’s seemingly effortless penchant for knocking down a high percentage of free-throws. Coming from a 7-footer, hitting upwards of seventy-percent from the stripe is no small feat. Then I saw his shooting percentages from the field, and the murmurs got a little bit louder. Then I looked at his per-36 minutes statistics, and a warm glow began resonating from my temple. This guy is being as ill-used as Nene. Except where Nene was out of position, Mozgov wasn’t seeing the floor.

I decided to dig deeper. Since 1946-47, there have been twenty-two players measuring 7-feet or taller shoot 68-percent from the free-throw line, greater than 50-percent from the floor, and play at least 1200 minutes. Timofey Mozgov is one of them. Roy Hibbert is not. Names of those who did make the list? Yao Ming, Rik Smits, Bill Cartwright, Pau Gasol, Patrick Ewing, David Robinson, Kareem Abdul-Jabaar, Robert Parish, Hakeem Olajuwon, Andrew Bynum, Dikembe Mutombo, and Tree Rollins. There are a few other names. All of them just as impressive. The fact that Timo is putting up these numbers without a structured offense run through him (or anyone, for that matter) is the most impressive thing of all.

Small sample size? Absolutely. No argument. But it’s not as small as you think. Especially when considering his fifty-five games in Denver have seen slow, steady, measured improvement. Consider the improvement you’d see if he was actually granted the minutes Denver’s other “energy” guys get. Imagine the improvement you’d see if Mozgov was in a system where his half-court game could develop and flourish, instead of one where it’s always “go-go-go”. Timo played most of his rookie year in New York under Mike D’Antoni, where a prototypical center is often not necessary. For this reason, among others, Mozgov’s shooting numbers didn’t reach their ultimate potential. George Karl and Mike D’Antoni have similar coaching philosophies for sure, as both prefer a running style. Where the two differ, however, is Karl allows his players more freedom to play to their instincts. Neither have a particularly sound coaching style for winning playoff basketball, but only D’Antoni has the infamous “seven-seconds-or-less” value system. If Mozgov gets into a situation where the game is allowed to slow down for him, he is going to blossom into the big-time player he is destined to be. But, like most things, it’s totally environment-dependent. D’Antoni was a bad fit. George Karl was slightly better. Anywhere a highly structured offense already exists should be optimal. Because it’s all there. His defense improved dramatically from his rookie year. His offensive game struggled a bit, but not in such a way that it can’t be improved. After watching every possession with which he was involved last season, I see a few things happening for him going forward:

1. His visits to the free-throw line should reach their rookie levels and then exceed them as he’s not been one to get the benefit of the doubt from officials. There were countless times where a whistle should have gone his way but didn’t.
2. Because of this, I imagine his offensive rating to greatly increase, as he’ll be responsible for reduced turnovers and more visits to the line. Every instance where he could have been shooting free-throws but a foul went uncalled, Mozgov was credited for a turnover. This has a doubly negative effect on his offensive rating.
3. If he’s given more minutes, I imagine his visits to the free-throw line increasing, as officials are apt to give players they see the benefit of the doubt more often than those they do not.
4. Seeing as how his TS% and usage rate increased concurrently, I see no reason why his percentages from the floor cannot sustain.

In the sixteen games where Mozgov played more than eighteen minutes (playoffs included), the Nuggets went 11-5. Further, in the twelve games he played twenty or more minutes, Denver went 8-4. For a Nuggets team that went 41-32 last year (playoffs included), Mozgov’s contributions are undervalued, at the very least. But Mozgov is still a great player to put alongside Kenneth Faried, as he, like Nene, spaces the floor, which will allow the unskilled rebounder to float.

Timofey Mozgov regular season output

Conversely, in the nineteen games Mozgov’s teammate Kosta Koufos played eighteen or more minutes, the Nuggets went 10-9. Koufos, for all intents and purposes, is more productive. Mosgov though, is clearly more important. And this is where the disconnect continues to linger in the Nuggets’ front office. Where they see production, I see smoke and mirrors. Where they see nothing, I see potential greatness if given the proper coaching and opportunity. This is why I didn’t even bother comparing the two players head-to-head. Because there is no comparison.

Kosta Koufos regular season output

Production will win you games against the dregs of the league. Skill AND size will win you games against the league’s best. And it will do so consistently. This is why Denver will continue to struggle on the periphery. In the lone game last season where Mozgov saw the floor for over thirty minutes, he was a terror. If a 16-7-3-1-1 performance against the New York Knicks’ Tyson Chandler doesn’t set off any light bulbs, nothing will.

That said, Mozgov’s days in Denver are likely over. They don’t know what they have, and thus, will let it walk. This is why Nene was traded for JaVale McGee. This is why their draft addressed no areas of specific need, of which there are many. This is why they may miss the playoffs next year. Because the times they’re content standing pat with what they have are the times they should be making moves. The times they’re making moves are those where they should be standing pat.

Editor’s note: There was much more to include in this study. If you have any further questions, please leave it in the comments section or follow me on Twitter. Thanks for reading.

What’s Wrong with Denver? And Where do We Go from Here?

Where does Denver go with the twentieth pick?

Following the surprising trade of longtime power forward/center Nene in March, their needs are wide-ranging.

There is currently one player on the roster that is absolutely untouchable. And that is Danilo Gallinari. He is a great player. But like every great player, he needs other great players surrounding him to maximize his potential. Trading Nene killed any and all potential growth Gallinari was to experience because it expedited his only solid pick-and-roll partner. When Denver was hot in late January, it was on the heels of Gallinari and Nene spearheading their attack. Gallo’s talents are best utilized when he’s manning the point-forward position. Nene was the only big on the team with the hands and skill capable of running with Gallinari, as evidenced by the following:

This is why after the trade, Gallo’s utility went downhill. He was being put in situations unsuitable to his talents — as a post-player and isolation scorer. As such, this is the problem we run into with far too much frequency in Denver over the last decade: Players being put in uncomfortable positions and situations not relative to their talent.

Exhibit A:

Nene Hilario was drafted out of Brazil in the 2002 draft. A 6-foot-11, 250 lb. phenom was ushered into Denver after a superb draft day trade by then Nuggets’ General Manager Kiki Vandeweghe. (The fact they also drafted Nikoloz Tskitishvili in the same year is something we’ll gloss over for the time being.) Where Denver, and most of all, Kiki, went wrong is when they followed that up two seasons later by signing Kenyon Martin to a max contract. The draft picks traded for the rights to Kenyon’s contract ended up being meaningless. Martin’s new contract, however, was not.

In July 2004, with Nene coming off two healthy seasons of great basketball, and at the mere age of 21, it seemed like a silly move to make Kenyon Martin one of the highest-paid players in the league. With Kenyon aboard making max money and Nene on the shelf for brief parts of the year, Martin was pushed into the starter’s role at power forward during the 2005 season. Marcus Camby (who had also just been re-signed) was perfect at center for a team led by the lax defense of prized-pupil Carmelo Anthony. But when Martin laid claim to the starter’s role at four, Nene was on the outside looking in. And Denver couldn’t trade Kenyon’s contract. They were absolutely hamstrung by it. Could they have handled it any better than they did? Could they have traded him to someone and gotten a schmuck back in return (in much the same way they did Nene for JaVale)? Could they have moved Martin to the bench while Nene and Marcus Camby formed one of the most dominant front courts in the game? Maybe. But hindsight is 20/20. Given the situation, they probably handled it to the best of their ability. Moving the highly volatile Martin to the bench would have upset an already tepid locker room even more. Moving him out of town would have been preferable. After all, they did this very thing to a great  player just six years later.

The Kenyon signing was bad for everyone. But they handled it the best way possible. The NBA is a player’s league. As such, the players earning the most scratch will find the most time.  Also, rarely is anything as easy as it seems.

However, there seemed to be no backup plan should this situation with Martin not work out. Which, during the 2006 playoffs, appeared to be near-certainty.

Exhibit B.

Denver trades floor general and team glue-guy Andre Miller to the Philadelphia 76ers for guard Allen Iverson. This was a blockbuster deal in 2006 that brought much attention to the Mile Hi City. Who was going to get the ball in crunch-time? Iverson or Carmelo? How were they going to share one ball? Who’s team was it going to be? All of these questions and more were asked during the initial stages of the trade talks and beyond. What Denver ended up doing with this trade more damaging than anything else was ignore the fact they were moving their only NBA quality point guard for the volatile Iverson.[1] In their haste, they made a string of bad judgments that eventually caused major ripple-effects for the next half-decade:

1. Iverson was brought aboard and almost immediately took ownership of the team as Carmelo sat out a 15-game suspension for his participation in the brawl in New York on December 16, 2006.
2. Iverson’s need to have the ball in his hands to make plays left Anthony out in the cold, and thus, hindered his development as the premiere offensive threat he was destined to become. Carmelo was at one time talked up to be an MVP candidate; especially at the beginning of that 2006 season, when George Karl had his Nuggets cruising.
3. Denver had seemingly no backup plan in the works for their newfound hole at point guard as they took nearly a full month to find Miller’s replacement in the Milwaukee Bucks’ Steve Blake. Blake was a good temporary stop-gap. But was he the answer long-term for Denver? Most certainly not.
4.  Anthony Carter was brought in that April for the playoffs. He was retained in the summer for the veteran’s minimum. Chucky Atkins was also signed that summer in the hopes that he would take command of the team’s starting point guard role. He never materialized as questions about his health took more time to answer than whatever scant amount of minutes he found on the floor. Heady young point guard Mike Wilks was signed, then released, then re-signed, then released.
5. The whole 2007 season was played with Anthony Carter at point guard. Anthony Carter would have been lucky to get off the bench in most NBA cities. Yet here he was starting at point guard for a franchise that had Marcus Camby, Carmelo Anthony, Allen Iverson, and Kenyon Martin in its arsenal (along with Nene Hilario and J.R. Smith off the bench.) Would you hire a 15 year-old with his learner’s permit to park your ’69 Shelby GT Mustang? Of course you wouldn’t. You’d be fucking insane to. And so Denver once again had a player contributing where he should not have even been considered an option.

Backup plans? Contingency plans? Anything?

Exhibit C.

Three games into the 2008 season saw the beginnings of what could have become a franchise-changing trade. Denver was able to move Iverson to the Detroit Pistons for hometown hero Chauncey Billups. The Chauncey Billups era was on. Denver had finally found their point guard. He was going to remain in Denver until he retired and then move into the front office in an advisory role. It was going to be the perfect storybook ending to what would hopefully become a Hall-of-Fame career. The addition of Billups had an almost surreal and immediate impact on Denver’s fortunes. Everyone moved back to their natural positions. Chauncey was the guard who could score and facilitate. Dahntay Jones was a defensive stopper. Kenyon Martin (as unskilled and passably awful as he was on offense) was the defensive quarterback. And Nene Hilario and Carmelo Anthony would flourish on the offensive end with Chauncey getting them the ball in their spots for maximum success. Chauncey was the vice-president to George Karl’s bench presidency. He wasn’t going to be as sneaky-good as Andre Miller was. But he was going to provide the team with the necessary structure to make up for whatever George Karl lacked from the sidelines. He made certain there were diagramed plays called out of timeouts (something I’m still not certain George Karl has taken the onus of implementing). He made certain the matchup advantages were there for Denver to capitalize on when they arose. He brought a thinking-man’s game to Denver. Where Andre Miller was more laissez-faire, Chauncey was more cerebral. The pull-up jumpers in transition he was so famous for were something Denver greatly needed, as they were a manifestation of his thinking on the floor — automatic and natural.

Denver made the 2009 Western Conference Finals. But rather than keep the team that brought the most success to Denver in twenty-five years, they jettisoned Dahntay Jones for nothing. His physical presence and defensive leadership from both the court and the bench were sorely missed the next year when George Karl fell ill to cancer. Arron Afflalo, a seemingly large upgrade, was brought in from Detroit in Jones’s stead. That is all fine and good, but, why mess with what brought you your greatest success?

Backup plans? Contingency plans? Considering every possible potentiality? I’m sensing a theme here.

Exhibit D.

Marcus Camby is traded to the Los Angeles Clippers for 2010 second round pick (Willie Warren). Denver, once again, had moved one of their better pieces in the hopes that their prized-big man Nene would just slide over to center in Camby’s absence. They not only made this trade with that in mind, they moved Camby for absolutely nothing. Knowing Chris “Birdman” Andersen was waiting in the wings (no pun intended) they made the move with Andersen’s bench role firm. Camby was gone. Nene was now going to play center – not his natural position. (The fact that the Washington Wizards, immediately after acquiring Nene, made a move to get Emeka Okafor at center so they could move Nene to his natural position at power forward is also something we’ll gloss over for the time being).

What now?

What could have been? When is Denver going to be held accountable for these decisions? When are those in charge of making these decisions going to have to answer for them? Why was Nene constantly put in situations where he was unable to maximize his success? Why was he always allowed to be the scapegoat when success didn’t materialize for him or the franchise even though he was never in his best possible position?

How does a Western Conference Finals team get totally dismantled in less than three years?

Why is Carmelo Anthony traded even though every indication early in the 2009-10 season showed he wanted to remain in Denver? What changed for him? Did he catch wind that some in the front office wanted him traded? Did he then feel like maybe his services were no longer appreciated in Denver and decide New York was a better option?

How in God’s name is Nene moved a mere three months after signing a new contract even though he’s coming off his three healthiest seasons as a pro? He missed some games during a lockout-shortened season. Now is the time to usher him out of Denver? Why did the Denver front office freak out and trade him for a project at center in JaVale McGee?

Why was Chauncey Billups included in the Carmelo Anthony trade when the players that made the trade bigger were simply filler? Why was Wilson Chandler included when he should barely be getting off the bench for a team in the NBA? Is Chandler another in a long line of players who are only successful in Mike D’Antoni’s system? Why was he then granted a new contract in Denver and then not able to play for the duration of the season after getting hurt? Can he not be traded like Nene was for similar reasons?

At what point do the players traded stop being the scapegoat and the people in charge of moving them take responsibility? When is the franchise going to have any form of stability? When will their best players be identified for being so and held onto for the duration of their careers?

What are they doing? Is Ty Lawson truly the point guard of the future for the Denver Nuggets? Is JaVale McGee truly the center of the future for the Denver Nuggets? Given that he was only allowed twenty or so games in a lockout-shortened season to showcase his talents, I’m not sure we are in any position to answer that question. Can Danilo Gallinari reach his greatest success without a viable big man to run pick-and-rolls with in the rotation? What is this team doing with Timofey Mozgov – the guy supposedly holding up the Carmelo trade in the first place? The Russian big man with the most skill of anyone on the roster is being ill-used and ill-fitted to maximize his own potential. Is he being coached to become a post-option? And what about Kenneth Faried? Is he a starter in the NBA? Can his superior rebounding abilities allow his massive deficiencies in other areas to be overlooked? Those questions and more will be answered on Monday in part two.

Because how can any player possibly be drafted if we don’t know whether or not they’ll be used correctly in the first place?

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[1] Andre Miller was more than just Denver’s point guard. He was what made the whole damn show work. He’s as quiet and understated a player as you will find in the NBA. And that’s fine. But it’s also something that works to his detriment. Because you can’t always see what he’s doing on the floor with your eyes or hear it with your ears. It’s more subtle things with Miller. It’s finding JaVale McGee for an alley-oop from three-quarters down the floor. It’s drawing a defender his direction on a fast-break and putting a pin-point pass in the chest of Al Harrington as he’s sitting under the bucket wide-open. It’s all these subtle nuances to the game that not everyone sees that make Andre Miller so valuable. His ability to see mismatches before anyone else on the court even has the wherewithal to call them out. His quick decisions to post up a smaller guard and work opposing players into a frenzy with a succession of pump-fakes and pass-fakes and hop-fakes. His ability to get to the line at will. His aplomb for working officials into calling the game more in his favor. All of these things make Andre Miller beyond valuable to any and every team he’s ever been a part of. It’s why he has such staying power. It’s why he’s still in demand. And it’s why whoever signs him next will reap the benefits of it beyond their or anyone else’s comprehension. It’s also why he won’t be back in Denver next season. He is too old in age and demanding in salary for Denver to change philosophy on a whim for his pleasing. He will move on to a brighter city and hopefully achieve his greatest glory by getting the one thing that’s always eluded him: a championship ring.